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First Do No Harm. 
Second Save Life?
Neil Allen1
Some 50,352 people killed themselves in England and Wales between 1997 and 2006.2 Reducing this
human toll of inner turmoil has long been a key national priority for health services.3 But protecting us
from ourselves is no easy task when the apparent benefits of escaping life outweigh the agony of having
to endure it. Often it is too late for someone’s suicidal ideation to come to the attention of the authorities.
Sometimes, however, the risk to life is more readily apparent: on average, 1300 patients already known to
mental health services commit suicide every year.4
Our moral and legal obligations surrounding suicide arguably stand poles apart. English law does not
encourage good Samaritanism. Just as the priest and Levite walked past the wounded man on their way
from Jerusalem to Jericho,5 so too are we permitted to walk past the suicidal man from Jevington to
Jarrow. To idly watch a rescuable suicidist leap from a cliff top might raise a moral eyebrow. But such
omissions are perfectly lawful at common law6 because foreseeing death does not trigger any duty of care
to prevent it.7 Yet such obligational divergence does not deter volunteers from preventively patrolling the
infamous suicide spot of Beachy Head.8
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 is
slowly realigning the moral and legal obligations of public bodies to protect life, with Article 2 imposing
three duties upon the state. Firstly, a negative duty to refrain from taking life, save in prescribed
exceptional circumstances. Secondly, a procedural obligation to investigate deaths for which it might bear
some responsibility.9 Finally, there is a positive obligation to take steps to protect our lives which is the
exclusive focus of this paper.
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Savage10 Circumstances
Carol Savage was one of 166 psychiatric in-patients who took their own lives in 2004.11 The day after
voluntarily attending Runwell hospital, she was detained for treatment under section 3 of the Mental
Health Act 1983 (‘the 1983 Act’) with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. Having made a number of
attempts to leave the open acute psychiatric ward, checks on her whereabouts were prescribed for every
30 minutes. Believed to be at low risk of suicide, Mrs Savage was allegedly left unsupervised on hospital
grounds, from which she was able to abscond, walking two miles to Wickford railway station before fatally
jumping in front of a train. 
With the coroner’s jury having concluded that the hospital’s preventive precautions were “inadequate”,
her daughter claimed that the trust had breached her mother’s right to life by allowing her to escape. 
The House of Lords12 therefore had to determine the test for establishing the circumstances in which a
detained patient’s suicide would violate Article 2. Substantive opinions were delivered by Lord Rodger
and Baroness Hale, with whom Lords Walker, Neuberger and Scott concurred, the last handing down a
short judgment. 
Lord Rodger noted13 that Article 2’s positive obligation to protect life comprised three duties. 
The primary duty required the state to establish an effective system of criminal law to deter those who
threatened life, backed up by law enforcement machinery to prevent, suppress and punish its breaches.
Secondly, general protective measures may be required to secure the health and well-being of, for
example, prisoners and patients (‘the Powell duty’14). These complemented the primary duty and typically
obliged the relevant authorities to recruit competent staff, maintain high professional standards, and put
in place suitable systems of work so as to protect life. Thirdly, in appropriate circumstances, an operational
duty to protect the life of a specific individual may be imposed which was “distinct from, and additional
to”15 that general duty (‘the Osman duty’16).
Runwell hospital clearly owed the Powell duty to take general precautions which mirrored the position at
common law. Failure to do so could amount to both negligence and a breach of Article 2. If these general
steps were taken but some medical error nevertheless resulted in death, there may be liability in
negligence but not under Article 2. With hospital authorities and their staff already subject to this general
obligation, Lord Rodger could not see why they should not also be under the “usual complementary
operational obligation”17 to try to prevent a particular suicide. In fact, there was no valid reason for them
not to. Priority had to be given to saving life in such critical circumstances; otherwise negligence and a
violation of Article 2 could result. 
Baroness Hale reached the same conclusion but covered “somewhat different ground along the way”. 
The positive obligations generally required proper systems to be put in place. But in some circumstances
a protective duty towards a particular individual was triggered, although not by ordinary medical
negligence alone. There was “little doubt that it [was] right in principle” to apply the Osman test to
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Civ 1375) was reviewed by the author in the Journal of
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Law 93.
13 At [30] and [69].
14 Powell v. United Kingdom (2000) 30 EHRR CD362.
15 At [72].
16 Osman v. United Kingdom (1998) 29 EHRR 245.
17 At [65]-[66].
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patients detained under the 1983 Act. After all, the ECtHR had recognised the authorities’ obligation to
provide necessary healthcare to those detained and it was “difficult to distinguish between different
classes of people deprived of their liberty by the state.”18 Indeed, more of their ordinary civil rights were
deprived as compared with other forms of detainee. Thus, if the hospital authority knew, or ought to have
known, of a real and immediate risk that Mrs Savage would commit suicide, Article 2 imposed an
operational obligation on them to do all that could reasonably be expected to prevent it.
When to Save A Life
Article 2’s positive limb is broad-shouldered. It applies to “any activity, whether public or not, in which
the right to life may be at stake”.19 But, in principle, it falls within the state’s margin of appreciation to
choose the means for fulfilling its tripartite set of obligations.20 English criminal law is expected to satisfy
the demands of the primary duty, although not all threats to life are deterred; suicide being the obvious
example.21 In fact, criminalising all actions and omissions that put life at risk would no doubt violate other
Convention rights. 
The general duty is more practical than the primary duty and requires the state to make regulations
compelling public authorities to adopt appropriate measures for securing high professional standards and
the protection of life. It is undoubtedly owed in the sphere of public and private healthcare as regards the
acts and omissions of health professionals.22 That is to say, all hospital patients – detained or otherwise –
are its beneficiaries. In the community, emergency services, including mountain and sea rescue facilities,
similarly owe this duty to those whose lives are knowingly in danger. But it does not obligate any specific
result. It may, for example, require a regulatory framework to be put in place for rescuing mountain
climbers in distress; but it does not demand a deadline within which aerial ambulances must reach
them.23
The operational duty can be far more onerous. Where others threaten the right to life, the ECtHR has
recognised this obligation in a diverse range of circumstances: from policing,24 detention release,25 and
domestic violence,26 through to the management of dangerous activities27 and even political journalism.28
Where someone threatens their own right to life, Strasbourg has so far only had the opportunity to
recognise the obligation being owed to prisoners29 and army conscripts.30
But how far down the path of suicide prevention might the positivity of Article 2 be prepared to go?
Savage acknowledged the duty being owed to psychiatric patients detained for treatment. Logic would
18 At [101].
19 Furdík v. Slovakia (2009) 48 EHRR SE9 146, 157;
Öneryildiz v. Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 20 at [71].
20 Furdík ibid. at 157.
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of Purdy) v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] 3
WLR 403 led the DPP to revise his policy.
22 See Dodov v. Bulgaria (2008) 47 EHRR 41 at [70],
[79]-[83] and [87]; Byrzykowski v. Poland (2008) 
46 EHRR 32 at [104] and [106]; Vo v. France (2005)
40 EHRR 12 at [89]-[90]; Tarariyeva v. Russia (2009)
48 EHRR 26 at [74]; Powell v. United Kingdom (2000)
30 EHRR CD 362, 364.
23 Furdík ibid n19.
24 Ibid n16.
25 Tomaši  v. Croatia (Application no. 46598/06, 15
January 2009); Mastromatteo v. Italy (Application no.
37703/97, 24 October 2002); Bromiley v. United
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27 Öneryıldız v. Turkey (2004) 41 EHRR 325; LCB v.
United Kingdom (1998) 27 EHRR 212.
28 Gongadze v. Ukraine (2006) 43 EHRR 44.
29 Keenan v. United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 913.
30 Kilnic v. Turkey (Application no. 40145/98, 7 June
2005); Ataman v. Turkey (Application no. 46252/99, 
27 April 2006).
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extend it to those detained for assessment,31 in emergency circumstances,32 on a temporary holding
basis,33 and under the criminal provisions in Part 3 of the 1983 Act. Might it even extend beyond
detention? That was the key issue in Rabone v. Pennine Care NHS Trust34 which was the first reported
mental health case to test the boundaries of the Savage decision.
Informal Patients
Melanie Rabone was informally admitted to a locked ward at Stepping Hill hospital suffering from
depression. She was subject to 15 minute observations having attempted suicide three times in the
previous seven weeks. With her mood appearing to lift, the psychiatrist granted her request for home
leave. The following day she hanged herself from a tree in Lyme Park. The trust accepted negligence but
denied any breach of her right to life. 
Clearly the general obligation was owed by the trust: institutional precautions therefore had to be taken
to protect patients from committing suicide. For example, competent staff had to be recruited, high
professional standards maintained, and suitable systems of work put in place. Ms Rabone’s psychiatrist
was negligent. The medical treatment she received was fragmented and discontinuous. Staff had not been
trained in the use of the trust’s new care programme approach policy. Old forms were still being used. And
no documented risk reassessment was undertaken before leave was granted, with no support plan having
been put in place. Yet, according to Simon J., the general duty conferred by Article 2 had not been
breached: the circumstances “fell far short of a failure to have a system for the assessment of risk of suicide
in mental patients”.35 Clinical misjudgement and implementation of the system could be faulted; but not
the system itself. 
Could the operational duty have been owed to Ms Rabone who, it was held, was not deprived of her
liberty? In Savage, Baroness Hale had deliberately left this question open.36 Arguably Lord Rodger had
not for “[a]ny auction in the comparative vulnerability of prisoners, voluntary patients, and detained
patients would be as unedifying as it is unnecessary.”37 But Simon J. considered Savage to have drawn a
distinction “between those who are detained and lack capacity, and those who are not detained and have
capacity to consent or object to treatment”. The House of Lords had “implicitly confined” the duty to
compulsorily detained patients. 
A growing body of empirical research suggests that some patients detained under the 1983 Act in fact
retain capacity to consent to admission and treatment.38 Conversely, many informal patients lack such
capacity.39 So to rely upon incapacity to justify the operational duty does not provide the answer to the
Osman question. Nor, it is respectfully submitted, does the fact of being detained; otherwise the ECtHR
31 Pursuant to s 2 of the 1983 Act. 
32 Ibid. ss 4, 135 or 136.
33 Ibid. s 5.
34 [2009] EWHC 1827.
35 Ibid. at [81].
36 Ibid. n12 at [102].
37 Ibid. at [49]. His Lordship noted that in Powell, where the
patient was not detained, the ECtHR might have recognised
the operational duty, in well defined circumstances, to
prevent a patient from committing suicide.
38 J. Bellhouse et al, ‘Capacity-based mental health legislation
and its impact on clinical practice: 1) Admission to
Hospital’ (2003) Journal of Mental Health Law 9; J.
Bellhouse et al, ‘Capacity-based mental health legislation
and its impact on clinical practice: 2) Treatment in
Hospital’ (2003) Journal of Mental Health Law 24. See
also, D. Okai et al, ‘Mental capacity in psychiatric
patients’ (2007) 191 British Journal of Psychiatry 291.
39 D. Okai ibid.
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would not have recognised the duty being owed to suicidal army conscripts.40 Thus, its scope cannot be
limited solely to those deprived of their liberty by the state.41
Simon J. also rejected the assumption of responsibility approach: “All hospitals assume responsibility for
the safety and treatment of patients; but that does not mean that the operational duty under Article 2.1
arises in relation to all patients. On the contrary, it is clear that it does not.” Instead, the “important
factor” was “the exercise of coercive powers over an individual who (by reason) [sic] of the exercise of
such powers is particularly vulnerable”. This was missing and so the duty could not be owed. 
The ‘coerced vulnerability’ justification for recognising the operational duty is novel and reflects the
growing realisation that “[i]n many respects human rights law is all about the protection of the individual
from undue coercion”.42 Unfortunately, however, Simon J. does not expand upon it, save to say that
“voluntary mental health patients can leave when they want, are not deprived of any Convention rights
and have input in their own medical treatment”. Szmukler and Appelbaum43 have sought to particularise
the concept of coercion by describing a “spectrum of pressures” ranging from persuasion, interpersonal
leverage, and inducements or offers, through to threats and the use of compulsion. Why was Ms Rabone
not subject to the necessary degree of coercion, bearing in mind that she would have been detained under
the 1983 Act had she attempted to leave the ward? Would her comparative vulnerability with
compulsorily detained patients not be as unedifying as it is unnecessary?44
Where life is threatened by others, the operational duty is capable of being owed in circumstances where
the state is not exercising coercive powers. In Mitchell v. Glasgow City Council,45 for example, a man
repeatedly threatened to kill his next-door neighbour. Both were council tenants. The local authority
convened a meeting with the aggressor, at which he lost his temper and became abusive. An hour later he
killed the neighbour. The majority of the House of Lords asked the Osman question but decided that the
duty had not been triggered because the local authority could not have known of any real and immediate
risk to his life. Nothing was said or done on the day to alert them of any attack, let alone a risk of death. 
Should the right to life be protected differently when life is threatened by one’s own actions? Ms Kerrie
Wooltorton suffered from personality disorder.46 She had ingested antifreeze before accepting lifesaving
dialysis on up to nine previous occasions. She swallowed it a final time, called the ambulance services and,
it is reported, capacitously refused treatment, knowing that she would die. Did the consultant renal
physician violate Article 2 by failing to take reasonable steps to avert the real and immediate risk to life?
Would it make a difference if someone else had administered the poisonous substance if she was still
refusing treatment? 
40 Ibid. n30.
41 See also Bulut v. Turkey (Application no. 51480/99, 
3 July 2006) at [32].
42 G. Richardson, ‘Coercion and human rights: A European
perspective’ (2008) 17(3) Journal of Mental Health 245.
For the relevance of coercion to Article 5 see N. Allen,
‘Restricting movement or depriving liberty?’ (2009)
Journal of Mental Health Law 19.
43 G. Szmukler and P.S. Appelbaum, ‘Treatment pressures,
leverage, coercion and compulsion in mental health care’
(2008) 17(3) Journal of Mental Health 233. See also R.
Wynn, ‘Coercion in psychiatric care: clinical, legal, and
ethical controversies’ (2006) 10(4) International Journal
of Psychiatry in Clinical Practice 247.
44 In relation to the inherent jurisdiction, vulnerability has
been held to extend to those who are incapacitated “by
reason of such things as constraint, coercion, undue
influence or other vitiating factors” (Re SA (vulnerable
adult with capacity: marriage) [2006] 1 FLR 867 at
[79]). See M.C. Dunn et al, ‘To Empower or to Protect?
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Public Policy’ (2008) 28 Legal Studies 234.
45 [2009] UKHL 11.
46 C. Dyer, ‘Coroner rules that treating 26 year old woman
who wanted to die would have been unlawful’ (2009) 339
British Medical Journal 4070; S.A.M. McLean, ‘Live and
let die’ (2009) 339 British Medical Journal 4112. 
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Conclusions
English law still has a long way to go in clarifying the circumstances in which public authorities will
violate the right to life by failing to avert death. Rather than relying upon frail distinctions like detention
and capacity, perhaps more thought should be given to the relationship between the general and
operational duties of Article 2. Are they “distinct from” or “additional to” each other? Whether the source
of the risk to life should affect the relevance of the operational duty must then be considered. Must the
state do more to prevent threats from others than it does to prevent threats from oneself?
Even if concepts like coerced vulnerability are employed to justify the extension of the Osman duty to
those not in detention, they only relate to the applicability of the duty. Savage recognised that the
threshold for triggering that duty is high47 which is hardly surprising. Indeed, the ECtHR is wary of
imposing disproportionate burdens on public authorities.48 But once that threshold is reached,
establishing a breach of the duty is harder than establishing negligence.49 Health authorities will therefore
find that it is “not particularly stringent”50 to establish a defence because other Convention rights must
be taken into account in determining which steps it was reasonable to expect them to take. 
It follows that the operational duty “should not persuade the professionals to behave any more cautiously
or defensively than they are already persuaded to do by the ordinary law of negligence”.51 Therapeutic
risks must be taken despite risks to life. Runwell hospital was thus “entitled, and perhaps bound, to allow
Mrs Savage a degree of unsupervised freedom that did carry with it some risk that she might succeed in
absconding.”52 Doctors must first do no harm. But saving life at all costs does not seem to come second. 
47 Savage ibid. n12 at [78] per Baroness Hale. See also Van
Colle v. Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police
(Secretary of State for the Home Department intervening)
[2008] 3 WLR 593 at [66] per Lord Hope. 
48 Osman ibid. n16 at [116]; Keenan ibid. n27 at [90];
Akdo du v. Turkey (Application No. 46747/99, 18
October 2005) at [45]; Uçar v. Turkey (Application No.
52392/99, 11 April 2006) at [84]; Renolde v. France
(Application No. 5608/05, 16 January 2009) at [82].
49 Ibid. n12 at [99]. The House of Lords has yet to consider
the appropriate standard of proof in this regard.
50 Ibid. at [41] per Lord Rodger.
51 Ibid. at [100] per Baroness Hale.
52 Ibid. at [13] per Lord Scott.
